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Abstract 
 
Does there exist a genuine threat to the continuation of a broadly liberal international (and 
domestic) order, driven by the re-emergence of religious and secular fundamentalisms?  This 
paper assesses this issue in the context of, first the rise of territorial power and then its fate in a 
period of globalization and the revival of religious intolerance. The twin concepts of sovereign-
power and bio-power are deployed to investigate the emergence of territorial engineering in the 
18th century. A key feature of modern fundamentalisms is that they promote and trade-off the 
deterritorialization of social, political, cultural and economic activity. It is argued that this is a 
manifestation of a new form of ‘spiritual martial power’. The risks associated with these 
developments should not be over-exaggerated but they exists nonetheless. If this is the case, the 
problem becomes one of how to re-territorializes the activities and disputes engendered by this 
reappearance and re-emergence of spiritual martial power with its link to religious 
fundamentalism. Here the argument is that this requires a re-examination of the nature of 
international borders, and indeed a re-emphasis on their role, not just in respect to containing 
disorder and restoring the capacity for governance, but also as a way of re-configuring 
international toleration and of righting a wrong. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper explores the fate of ‘territorial engineering’ in respect to both the discourse and 
practice of globalization. Whilst the nature of production engineering and financial engineering 
are by now be quite familiar that of territorial engineering is less readily appreciated. This 
concept is explored in the context of first the construction of territorial power and then in regard 
to its possible fate in a period in which territorially base authority seems to be under some threat. 
 
It is the twin concepts of sovereign-power and bio-power that have been central in organizing the 
construction of territorial power, it is argued. But beneath, or  perhaps better, behind such 
territorially engineered power has always lurked another form of power, what is termed here a 
‘spiritual martial power’. Spiritual martial power has to do with the struggles formed in the 
context of ‘blood, toil and soil’, heroic virtue and legendary combat. Its connection to ‘race’, 
ethnicity and religiosity are explored, and to ‘warrior politics’ and to terror. 
 
The questions posed are: ‘Why and how has such a spiritual martial power reappeared in the 
present international context?’, ‘What is its relationship to sovereign-power and bio-power?’, 
‘How has this affected the notion of territoriality in particular?’, and finally, ‘Can spiritual 
martial power be contained within the confines of a broadly liberal form of international 
governance?’ 
 
These questions are examined in the context of the re-emergence of different religious discourses 
and of religious organizations as definite practices or technologies of government. The 
relationship between such religious forms or organization and forms of liberal governmentality is 
preliminarily explored. Finally, the connection of all of this to a much wider ‘ethical turn’ in the 
conduct of governance is alluded to. 
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THE NOTION OF ‘TERRITORIAL ENGINEERING’ 
 
The idea of production engineering is a well established one. It involves all those material 
processes and technologies that go to make commodities and services that are on offer in the 
market place. In addition to this, there is by now a well established discourse about financial 
engineering. This concept is perhaps less familiar than that of production engineering but it has 
to do with how firms conduct a parallel activity to production engineering so as to reproduce 
themselves financially. It involves such activities as the raising of funds for investment, merger 
and takeover business, chasing subsidies of various kinds, pricing and marketing strategies, the 
monitoring and manipulation of company share-prices, practices of accounting for profit, etc. 
Often such financial engineering is associated with less than transparent or honest dealings, 
though there is no necessary connection to this aspect of company activity. This paper extends 
the idea of engineering – in the form of a deliberative activity of forging together a disparate set 
of mechanisms, processes and practices -- to that of a territory: hence the term ‘territorial 
engineering’. To set the discussion going Figure 1 introduces two key considerations that are 
argued to have been crucial in the historical construction of the notion of a territory: those of 
sovereign-power and bio-power. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
Sovereign-power was an invention of the 18th century. It has to do with the consolidation of 
authority and the law into a single unambiguous pinnacle of power. Fundamentally, ‘sovereign 
power’ involves the issue of who (or what) has ‘authority’ over life and death. It poses in an 
acute way the politics of life and death (Schmitt 1985, Agamben 1995). For instance, suicide is 
always a crime from the point of view of sovereign-power because it challenged the right of the 
sovereign to have the decisive authority over death. Terrorist acts of various kinds similarly 
contravene sovereign-power for the same reason.  They both directly challenge ‘sovereign-
power’. 
 
Bio-power involves the politics of vitality, of ‘man’ and ‘the body’ – indeed of the ‘body politic’. 
It is concerned with all those ‘techniques of government’ associated with the notion of a 
population (Foucault 1978): how to manage a population – how to nurture its health and hygiene, 
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how to ensure its IQ, how to attend to its nutritional requirements, how to establish and ensure its 
safety and security, its welfare, its reproductive capacities, its fighting capabilities, and so on. All 
the moral, ethical and economic techniques classically associated with what Foucault called the 
‘pastor and his flock’ as a mode of power (Hindess 1996). This was an invention of the 19th 
century 
 
As these two forms of power fused together we have the formation and consolidation of both a 
concern for and the capacity to establish a territory in the modern sense of the term, particularly 
the territory of the nation-state.1 It provided the space for the emergence of what I want to call 
‘territorial engineering’; that is, exactly how space is engineered into a territory that can be 
managed and run. In the modern period this is in part reproduced from definite material 
instruments and processes such as the issuing of passports, visas, social security numbers, 
driving licenses, identity cards and screening of physical features, biometric date, radar, 
defensive fortifications, rituals of meetings and crossings, involving various forms of 
classification and identification, and so on (see, for instance, Kearney 2004 and the references 
cited therein). 
 
But how was territory first shaped and formed in the shadow of sovereign-power and bio-power? 
 
One of the most interesting and ambitious books that poses this issue is Chandra Mukerji’s 
Territorial Ambitions and the Gardens of Versailles (Mukerji 1997). It this book she argues that 
the garden of Versailles was emblematic of the formation of the French territorial state. As Louis 
XIV stepped out on to the terrace at the back of his palace at Fontainbleau he saw France laid out 
before him. The garden was a metaphor for the whole of France. And its construction involved 
the assemblage of a vast array of design skills and techniques, emergent technologies, discourses 
and expertise of various kinds, practical skills, instruments and equipment, artistic conceptions, 
                                                 
1 The relationship between sovereign-power and bio-power is clearly more complex that I can go into here. For 
instance, there is a strong case for arguing that bio-power redefines sovereign-power; after the 18th century bio-
power becomes newly constitutive of sovereign-power. Of course, for Foucault sovereign power was always 
something of a problematic category since it spoke exclusively to the juridico-legal aspect of power which he was at 
pains to criticise. In addition, bio-power itself has gone through a number of transformations; from a concern with 
managing a population to managing only those at risk for instance. However, despite these well taken points, I want 
to preserve the basic architecture of Figure 1 for analytical convenience at this stage. 
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craft endeavors, and so on, all marshaled for the explicit purpose of creating ‘France in 
miniature’ as it were which could be surveyed and enjoyed from the vantage point of the terrace 
by the sovereign. It assembled and involved those very practical techniques that were themselves 
being used at the time to developed and consolidate the French territory as a whole; the 
collection of data, surveying, planning and mapping techniques, construction of earth works, the 
raising of finance, the construction of fortifications, canal and bridge building, the planting of 
forests, the erection of symbolic architectural motifs, drainage and water management, aesthetic 
deliberation, establishment of transport thoroughfares, and so on, were all brought to bear in the 
construction and laying-out of the garden. At the centre of this was the ‘tapis vert’ --  the lawn 
that runs down the centre of the garden, an open flat space which allowed the sovereign himself 
to write his own particular part in this endeavour. 
 
This is a telling and largely convincing story as to how to think about the concept of territorial 
engineering. But it is not the total story. And both these forms of power now seem to be under 
attack. 
 
 
SPIRITUAL MATIAL POWER AND TERRITORIAL ENGINEERING 
 
For instance, sovereign-power no longer seems fully able to determine the decisions over life and 
death – to have quite the same grip on governmental power as it used to.  This is being usurped 
by a new religiosity and ethics of the self, where for instance, suicide becomes an instrument of 
religious conscience and operates as a potential technique for establishing governmental power. 
In addition the same is the case with terrorist assassination. These are a crime in the era of 
sovereignty, but now they are increasingly being employed as a way of -- if not exactly usurping 
that power -- then of strongly  challenging it by offering an alternative claim to its legitimacy. 
And is bio-power such a strong element in the current configuration of governmental 
arrangements as the concern with – and the ability to foster and preserve -- a coherent population 
fades? These points thus serve to raise questions over Figure 1 as both a sufficiently general 
explanatory representation of the nature of ‘territorial engineering’ and the fate of such a 
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conception in the contemporary era. What is needed first, then, is a further elaboration of the 
nature of territorial engineering. This is done in the context of Figure 2. 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
In respect to the twin forms of power argued to articulate the notion of territory in Figure 1, the 
case of Figure 2 illustrates that there has always been another type of power lurking behind these 
two. For want of a better term this I call ‘spiritual martial power’.2 There are two aspects to this 
spiritual martial power: its discursive foundations and its practical organizational forms. I deal 
with these in turn. 
 
In a discursive sense this conception of power is wrought from struggles formed in the context of 
‘blood, toil and soil’, heroic virtue and legendary combat. It involves sagas and stories providing 
canonical images of patriotic virtue and extreme self-sacrifice, glory rooted in a morality of 
consequences and actual results, episodes in an endless drama of momentous stakes, whose plot 
is never determined in advance but always the outcome of intervention and fate. It trades on the 
renewal of honor and virility, the triumph of the will, and a politics of superstition. 
 
A further feature of this martial but also spiritual ethos is that it carries a heavily romanticized 
vision where the nihilistic craving for violence and turmoil overcome and overwhelm any form 
of stable social arrangements, civil order or governance. It celebrates extreme passion in combat, 
continual gladiatorial contestation. It can also foster an attitude of martyrdom and aesthetic acts 
of terror (even an ascetics of death). But it also implies a certain form of self-mastery. 
 
So I call the power associated with this set of attitudes and actions ‘spiritual martial power’ – a 
power that celebrates valor, endurance and suffering. This is an active power – or rather a ‘power 
                                                 
2 This conception of a spiritual martial power is derived from a rather liberal reading of the lectures in Foucault 
(2003). In as much that sovereign-power is associated with the term demos and bio-power with that of ethnos, 
spiritual martial power would be associated with the term credos. I thank Tom Osborne for suggesting that the term 
‘spiritual’ be added to the term martial in this formulation. 
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of action’, a power that invokes heroic effort above all else, the achievement of glory and the 
existence of a warrior culture. 
 
What are some of the practical modalities of this form of power?  
 
During the English Civil War radical elements of the New Model Army developed a critique of 
English history as it had unfolded since 1066. They argued that the Norman king William the 
Conqueror had destroyed the authentic lineage of Saxon warrior kings and their knightly valour 
(Foucault 2003, pp 63-84). The result was the sorry state of the monarchy in the early 17th 
century against which they were fighting. They wanted to restore this corrupted tradition 
(corrupted by ‘a foreigner’ of a different ‘race’) and re-install the former glorious era of what is 
termed here spiritual martial power. 
 
It also has its echoes in popular culture. The classic example would be Sir Walter Scott and his 
tales of daring do as in Ivanhoe, in the Arthur ian legends, of Richard the Lionheart, and in the 
contemporary interest in the Lord of the Rings saga, even the Harry Potter stories. What it more, 
it is not unconnected to E.P. Thompson’s quest for the authentic expression of the noble English 
working-class seen as something of a downtrodden and submerged social category, denied its 
proper place in history and ignored by bourgeois historiography (Valverde 2004). 
 
Furthermore, it appears in the form of Hardt and Negri’s concept of the ‘multitude’ that needs  to 
rise up against the exploitative forces of globalization and Empire (Hardt & Negri 2000). For 
them the multitude is a deterritorialized mass, an under-class awaiting their moment for 
emancipation (in some ways very much akin to Thompson’s English working-class heroes). 
 
In addition, it appears in the form of what Georgio Agamben has called ‘bare-life’ (Agamben 
1998). Bare life is what operates in the space of the camp. A camp for him is a place where 
sovereignty is both suspended but seen to be operating in its most extreme form and at its limit, 
since it is at the moment when sovereignty is temporarily suspended that indicates what or who 
holds and deploys such sovereign-power; the ability to declare the camp a space of the exception. 
But in as much tha t the camp is a place where sovereign-power is suspended ‘anything goes’ in 
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terms of decisions over life and death – Bare Life rules. Killing is neither a homicidal act (human 
law is suspended) nor a sacred act (religious law is suspended). The camp is a ‘zone of 
indistinction’ as far as life is concerned. 
 
Finally, probably the boldest expression of such a martial power in the contemporary period 
would be the image or figure of a nomadic and deterritorialized warrior culture  -- not just 
involving the de-politicized terrorist but also to some extent expressing what some traditional 
armed forces are argued to increasingly look like (Ignatieff 1997). Is George Bush the exemplary 
warrior politician? (Berman 2003) 
 
To some this may all sound an exaggeration but it captures a certain currency of the present 
period. Thus, instead of the liberal and rational determinants of territorial engineering to 
establish classic nation-states and a state system, we would have blood, toil and soil as the 
determinant moments in the struggle for political control over a territory, often, though not 
exclusively, driven by religious conviction and organizations. And this has become trans-
territorial in form. It is the attachment of religious and other fundamentalism to martial power 
that gives them -- and martial power itself   -- their current spiritual potency3. Whilst the 
‘ordinary’ politics of religions (even of the  fundamentalist varieties) may be philanthropic and 
involve charitable welfarism – in the main religious organizations work in the fields of the mass 
media (newspapers, TV, radio, magazines), in education, through charitable work and voluntary 
work -- fundamentalisms are ‘orthoprax’ rather than orthodox; i.e. they stress the conformity to 
many practices of the self and codes of conduct above strict exegesis of the scriptures, and this 
emphasis on confessional practices above scriptual disputation provides the space for martial 
power to attach itself neatly to religious fundamentalism (though such a systematic observance 
of ritual practices does not come at the expense of belief, of course). The mobilizatory nature of 
                                                 
3 The relationship between fundamentalisms (and not just religious ones) and martial power in the current period is 
a complex one, and one I have yet to explore in full. On the general issue of what  fundamentalisms stand for see 
Sim (2004) and (Marty & Appleby 1991-94). For recent analyses of religious fundamentalisms see Ali (2002) and 
Ruthven (2004). On the issues of religious fundamentalism and terror see Berman (2003), Juergensmeyer (2003) and 
Stern (2004). A number of these books are what might be termed ‘popular pot-boilers’ but they are instructive 
nonetheless and should not be dismissed out of hand. 
In the following analysis not much more is said about secular fundamentalisms (like extreme neo-liberal economic 
analysis and policy prescriptions). But –although operating in a completely different register – there are connections 
between religious and secular fundamentalism in terms of martial power, particularly in the discursive drive that 
typifies both of them. I intend to explore this connection fully in a further paper. 
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martial-power feeds into its warrior like status with its emphasis on action. One of its 
manifestations is the ‘mass mobilization’ and the ‘mass protest’ of post-ideological ‘politics’, 
though in large part fundamentalist religious terrorist groups work through secretive 
underground networks for obvious reasons.4  
 
Finally in this section, although one might want to be very skeptical of the Clash of Civilizations 
thesis advanced by Samuel Huntingdon (Huntingdon 1996, see also Huntingdon 2004), he does 
pick up on some contemporary moments in the operation of martial-power. He argues that the 
two main monotheisms in contemporary theocratic dispute – extremist Christianity and Islam -- 
are deterritorialized in their modalities of operation. They operate with the idea of a dynamic 
moving frontier of conversion impervious to national or any other borders. He also points out 
that the boundary between these -- where his clashes are most acute – has been a very bloody one 
indeed. 
 
 
TOLLERATION 
 
Give the emphasis placed upon the revival of religious extremism in accounting for the re-
emergence of spiritual martial power as a threat to the sovereign-power/bio-power duality that 
underpins territorial engineering I want now to turn to the way religious toleration was 
established at the end of the 17th Century. This will open up a possible route for confronting and 
dealing with the rise of religious fundamentalisms in the present period, which, I should stress, is 
a quite different one to that of the 17th Century. Nonetheless, there are some interesting parallels 
which are worth exploring. 
 
To a large extent it was the Christian religion that ‘pacified’ the warrior-like spirituality of 
martial power in Europe during the 17th Century. It grafted onto the extant martial power a 
passive form of suffering, servitude and deference. Or perhaps better expressed it remolded 
warrior martial power into a more precise and clinical form of martial power, one where 
passivity becomes heroic. This opened the way initially to the attachment of civic virtue to 
                                                 
4 On the organizational nature of fundamentalist terrorist networks see Gunaranta (2002) and Sageman (2004). 
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martial power, and then to the undermining, the undercutting and eventually the dilution of 
warrior like martial power with a new heroic attachment to civic virtue.5 
 
And it is the category of toleration that needs to be brought more squarely back into the 
international sphere, something returned to in a moment.  
 
To a large extent toleration in its traditional sense has been seen as a supreme liberal virtue. And 
as a liberal virtue it is connected – closely connected – to individual conscience and private 
reflection. So the history of toleration is closely associated with the rise of religious toleration in 
particular and the rights of individuals to profess, practice and maintain whichever confessional 
doctrine they wish. Their adherence to this confessional doctrine is a matter of their private 
opinions, deliberations and consciences.  
 
Importantly, the original political struggles to establish religious toleration within the context and 
boundaries of the nation state were not entirely divorced from ‘international issues’. After all the 
Treaty of Westphalia (1648) – which began the moves towards ending the religious wars and 
intolerance in Europe – was an international treaty. And it was an international treaty that 
established probably the first ever human right – religious freedom of a sort. The Treaty allowed 
the confessional character of a state to be determined by its ruler with the agreement that other 
states should not interfere or intervene in the internal religious affairs of that state; they should 
respect its confessional character and refrain from inciting trouble or supporting domestic 
religious strife in other states (in fact this religious ‘toleration’ was only extended to those of 
Catholic, Lutheran and Calvinist faiths). A key clause in the Treaty was one allowing emigration 
for those who did not wish to adhere to the confessional character of the state in which they 
lived. In effect this clause established the right of individual religious conscience – as suggested 
above probably the first ever 'civil right' -- which could legitimately exist alongside the different 
confessional character of the state in which such individuals lived. The Treaty of Westphalia thus 
                                                 
5 I would suggest that Machiavelli operated as a crucial intermediate step in the transformation and move from full 
blown mart ial power to its civilizing pacification. For Machiavelli the morality of an action is determined by the 
excellence of its outcome; if it is effective it is virtuous. His morality is illusion free, where honor, self interests and 
fear are managed for a ‘we ll governed polity’. Primitive necessity rules, but an enlightened self-interest is a key 
feature of his political outlook. 
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established the principle of religious toleration (if not always its practice, of course). It also 
showed how an international treaty was of key importance in establishing the rights of 
individuals within their domestic territories who, potentially at least, could claim these rights 
against certain powers of the ruler him/herself. This Treaty also enabled the true ‘nation state’ to 
arise and consolidate, since the sovereign power was able to enforce a sole rule over a given 
territory, and this was legitimated by a recognition from other powers. Before that this rule had 
always been open to a challenge from abroad.6 
 
The advent of religious toleration in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries involved a two 
step process7. The first was to disengage the State from the Church, asserting the formers 
independence from any confessional appropriation by the latter. The second step was to turn 
religious experience into a matter of the holding of opinions. It was in this way that radical 
spiritualism could be recast as a matter of private conscience. Thus -- in terms of religious belief 
in this case -- these two moves at one and the same time served to both ‘de -politicize’ the Church 
and create a ‘public sphere’ of state activity in distinction to a ‘private sphere’ of individual 
conscience or opinion. ‘Domestic religious toleration’ followed by being confined within the 
civil sphere, over which the State would adjudicate and guarantee by acting as the impartial 
arbitrator between any competing, but now private, interests. The defining relationship between 
toleration and religion is summed up by Kamen (1967): “In its broadest sense, toleration can be 
understood to mean the concession of liberty to those who dissent in religion” (p.7). 
 
Now, here is a key point in the argument. These moves – the Treaty of Westphalia and the rise of 
religious toleration via the separation of Church and State – represented a genuine political 
event. Political events are those events that declare a radical equality (Badiou 2001, Rancière 
                                                 
6 The Treaty of Westphalia has been afforded an exalted status in the establishment of the international system of 
states, one that it perhaps does not fully deserve. Whilst there is now a well established critique of this status (see for 
instance Teschke 2003, Rosenberg 2004) the continued existence of nation states is a reality that cannot be ignored, 
as will be argued at length later. The burden of the argument to come is that the ‘institutions’ of the nation-state and 
the state system need to be strengthened and de-territorialized activity re-territorialized. 
7 These paragraphs draw upon Thompson 2002, and also Asad 2003, Creppell 2003, Walzer 1997 and Zagorin 
2003. 
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1999)8. They announce an equality where there had previously been a deep inequality. They 
right a wrong. By announcing the essential equality of religious beliefs and confessional 
practices an inequality and a wrong were attended to in a practical context of some significance. 
This is why the events surrounding these moves have endured for so long. They were a genuine 
and fundamental political event. 
 
The question I want to raise is what would such a political event look like in the present period, 
also to some extent typified by a radical inequality involving religious disputation, at least 
ostensibly? 
 
A further point to make about the way toleration is approached here is to try to differentiate it 
from an influential conception that sees toleration as an essentially repressive act (Marcuse 
1965). In the case of the Marcusian approach, the extension of toleration to ones adversaries 
serves only to temporarily placate them in the interests of maintaining authority over them or to 
bolster an existing inequality in favour of the more powerful party. As against this approach, I 
would wish to define toleration as the cultivation of a style of behaviour that embodies a studied 
indifference towards difference. This is what expresses its commitment to a radical equality of 
treatment. In this sense, toleration is a genuinely mutual act, one that does not necessarily favour 
either party. Rather, whilst explicitly recognizing differences between groups, however defined, 
its objective is to accept these differences for what they are, share a mild interest in them, but to 
leave it at that and not to continually interfere. Now, this might seem to precisely license gross 
inequalities and deny the existence of fundamental disagreements. But it need not necessarily 
lead to this. As argued below, whilst it might provide a mechanism for tolerating the intolerant, 
it does not necessarily mean tolerating the intolerable. I try to make these distinctions clear in a 
moment (Ricoeur 1996) 
 
But exactly what it is that is to be tolerated in the international sphere under present conditions? 
In the historical case of religious toleration it was, of course, confessional choice that was to be 
                                                 
8 I wish to acknowledge Claudia Aradau in drawing my explicit attention to this rather precise definition of a 
political event (see her essay ‘(In)Different politics: trafficking in women and resistance as event’, Open Un iversity, 
2004). I take this ‘ethical’ moment in the foundation of politics to be a consequence of politics being about 
conviction and therefore always involving an ethos. 
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tolerated. In the contemporary period, it is suggested, toleration has mainly to do with some very 
difficult issues associated with the existence of disputed international borders that define distinct 
territorial jurisdictions. This is the main difference between toleration in the 17th Century and 
toleration in the 21st – the axis of toleration is different -- religion then, national boundaries now. 
Whatever the current religious based disputes exist, they are over-determined by boundary 
disputes, it is suggested. 
 
And this will involve a very different type of political event to address it. I would controversially 
suggest that this political event involves the declaration of a fundamental equality in respect to 
all existent and extant international borders in the first instance. This is controversial since its 
might seem to involve a clear ‘inequality’ as existing international boundaries are often arbitrary 
and were imposed by occupying powers and colonial administrations. They are fiercely fought 
over as a consequence, or at least the subject of a constant disputation. Be that as it may, the 
point is that there are two sides to every border dispute, and both these positions have to be 
respected if toleration is to take hold. This is the nature of the radical equality to be announced 
here – it is to accept the necessity of a mutual recognition of the current status quo before 
anything more can be done. How this might be operationalized I return to in a moment. And this 
position is bolstered by a further recognition that peace and peaceful co-existence are very 
conservative objectives. Peace cannot be associated with radical change or a serious breach of 
the status quo – the redrawing of political and jurisdictional boundaries for instance. People have 
to feel safe and that their positions are not to be compromised if they are to agree to peace (rather 
than having peace ‘imposed’ upon them). 
 
These considerations would provide the necessary pre-requisites for the re-territorialization of 
the emergent spiritual martial power, preventing it getting out of control and to completely 
overwhelm a broadly liberal international order – which it is threatening to do9. Thus the claim 
here is that only if the ‘inequities’ associated with borders are attended to in the manner 
suggested here, and developed at greater length later, will it become possible to undermine 
                                                 
9 Paul Hirst posed this nicely in one of his last published contributions before his  death (Hirst 2003). He asked what 
were the limits to the accommodation of non-democratic, fundamentalist and religious governmental organization to 
the continuation of a liberal international order (p.55-58). The comments in the rest of this paper provide an initial 
response to this issue. 
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religious intolerance. The issues confronted in the following analysis is how to foster the 
conditions for a re-territorialization of social and political activity (and by extension of economic 
activity as well). There are some real advantages, then, to a Westphalian system of states. It is 
easier to secure governance and order under such circumstances than to celebrate the emergent 
transnationality of political and social forces that are thought to herald the advent of a new 
cosmopolitan era. Under contemporary circumstances this latter is more likely to degenerate into 
an anarchy of warrior politics driven by the spiritual martial power associated with religious 
ideological disputes. 
 
 
BOUNDARIES 
 
But how are boundaries thought and constituted?10 Boundaries exist as linked sites of difference 
and local oppositions. Differences and local oppositions are ‘connected up’; yoked together to 
form entities. Thus, boundaries exist ‘before’ entities. Entities -- the thing-ness of social space – 
are thus constituted by boundaries, not the reverse; thing-ness is an enduring entity, it is the 
quality of entitiness.  In principle, then boundaries could exist without entities – they are simply 
sites of difference, neighborhoods of oppositions. Members and strangers only exist in 
relationship to boundaries, as several dimensions of difference are linked up, connected to form a 
boundary. Members are placed ‘inside’ the entity-to-be, indeed members are made up by the 
establishment of that boundary. There cannot be the category of a ‘citizen’ without the idea of a 
national boundary. There cannot be an illegal immigrant without this either. There cannot 
properly be a ‘dehumanized’ camp occupant without there being a camp of a certain type first. 
 
Plans and scripts are one of the ways this yoking is done, it is in the action of scripting and 
narrating that pulls together a set of boundaries into a social entity with the quality of thingness 
(hence the importance of religious ideology in re-constituting new boundaries that ostensibly cut 
across existing national ones). Zones of difference are proto-boundaries than are yoked together 
to produce enduring entities. Of course, new differences are always being set up or emerging 
within groups, so how do a) old entities endure and b) new ones emerge? Old ones endure in as 
                                                 
10 The discussion relies heavily on Abbott 2001 and Walzer 1981. 
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much that cleavages are overlapped and compacted into a cohesiveness, an assemblage of 
various sides and sites of difference. Thus the boundary around a corporation links up various 
transactions and markets to create an entity – the firm (Holmström & Roberts 1998). The border 
around a territory is created by linking up various localities of difference, various frontiers of 
opposition. Neither space nor time can exist without boundaries from the point of view of this 
topological logic (Walzer 1981). As soon as an old boundary is broken a new one is formed. In 
the case of territories, new jurisdictions are formed. In fact the history of the 20th Century is one 
of a growing number of territorial boundaries around nation states, which is illustrated in Figure 
3. 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
As shown in Figure 3 there has been a quickening of the pace of national boundary formation 
since the ending of the second World War. So there are many more boundaries over which there 
could be disputes as we enter the 21st Century. Note also that this increase in the number of 
countries has been accompanies by an increase in economic openness (as measured by the trade 
to GDP ratio). Alesina and Spolaore (2003) argue that ‘globalization’ (in the form of increased 
international trade interdependency and investment integration) has encouraged the formation of 
‘smaller’ states (in terms of population or GDP not necessarily in terms of spatial area).11 But it 
is only as long as populations and territories feel economically and politically secure that this 
trend will continue, they suggest (see also Rieger & Leibfried 2003). 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL TOLERATION 
 
So how might all this help to think creatively about a relatively robust complex of mutually 
reinforcing dimensions guiding the establishment of a tolerant and peaceful coexistence in an 
increasingly fragmented and antagonistically poised international system? This section 
experiments somewhat speculatively with a list of conditions and principles that might begin to 
                                                 
11 They do not suggest that there is a strong ‘causal’ mechanisms operating here – from globalization to smaller 
states -- only that the former has allowed the latter to develop, and there tends towards a reciprocal relationship 
between the two trends (Alesina & Spolaore 2003, pp.192-99). 
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offer a vocabulary for thinking about this. The concrete circumstances under which these might 
operate as principles or how they might be deployed is not discussed here. We start with the most 
obvious of these conditions, the availability of financial resources and their deployment. 
 
Finance and Money.  
 
A regime of international toleration requires a lot of money to be devoted to it. The current state 
of disorder in the international system is not unrelated to the gross inequalities that continue to 
exist within countries (indeed here they are growing in the advanced industrial economies) or 
between the rich and the poor economies (though here they are some signs that international 
inequality may declining slightly -- see Thompson 2004). But, without a radical redistribution of 
income the prospects for long-term peaceful coexistence look bleak. 
 
However, there are issues closer to hand that could be addressed. In particularly there would 
need to be much more emphasis put on peacekeeping activities of various kinds and intelligence 
gathering. Military action is very expensive but so is peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is a growth 
industry, and the military know this. Some ‘armed forces’ have a comparative advantage in 
peace keeping over war-making. In many ways this is true of the British armed forces, and a lot 
of military personal recognize this12. The UK armed forces, for instance, could not prevail in 
any conflict overseas without the assistance of the US forces, as was demonstrated in Argentina 
and Iraq, and the more astute commanders and managers realize this. 
 
If ‘training for peace’ were to be taken seriously by armed forces, there would be much  less 
emphasis on hardware and more on software. However, the strategic decisions taken by the UK 
New Labour government have moved against this. They have gone for the hardware option (two 
new aircraft carriers, support for the Euro-fighter) and a watered down version of the RMA. In a 
                                                 
12 These comments are based upon my observations and conversations with military personnel whilst teaching at 
the UK Joint Services Defence College for several years. Some of the most ardent ‘peaceniks’ that I have met are 
from the army. They know that to orient themselves towards ‘peace-keeping’ is necessary if they are to, first of all, 
continue to attract funds and secondly not to loose out to ‘private’ peace keeping initiatives/intelligence gathering 
organizations that also see this as an opportunity and a growing market. If the anti-war movement were more 
intelligent they would try to capitalize on this dilemma for the armed forces, and try to strike up an ‘alliance for 
peace(keeping)’ with the armed forces (and against the privatization of peace)! 
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situation where you need ‘personnel-on-the-ground’ for peacekeeping activities, with skills more 
like those of an Oxfam field-officer or an armed constabulary, these high-tech equipment options 
are the wrong ones. 
 
Truths and truces  
 
Secondly, one further way to revive the lost virtue of toleration in international affairs is to 
emphasize the principle of 'truce seeking' above that of 'truth seeking'. Our social order is one in 
which truth seeking is the deeply embedded and widely deployed one. It appears in the form of 
the discourse "I am right and you are wrong" which animates so many aspects of our daily lives 
and intellectual culture. Finding who is to blame as things go wrong, and attributing guilt to 
those responsible are the supreme objectives of both our legal system and that of common 
justice. The finding of a true cause for things also lies behind the commitment to an 
interventionary political and economic culture. 
 
But truces are interesting situations, perhaps more interesting than truth situations, if we have in 
mind the fostering of toleration. Truces are positions -- often only temporary -- in which no party 
is fully satisfied or which has secured all its objectives. They are neither situations of continued 
conflict nor of outright victory or resolution, so they avoid celebratory gloating or humiliating 
defeat. They are 'in between' and thus uncomfortable. Nevertheless, they are truces; what more 
can we ask for in world where outbreaks of conflict of some kind seem inevitable? They offer 
periods for reflection and trust building. They provide an occasion to seek compromise and 
consensus, an opportunity to build cooperation and reconciliation, an opportunity to turn 
‘détente’ in an ‘entente’. In this way truce seeking behaviors and mechanisms represent an 
important way of defusing potential and actua l antagonistic conflicts. They are a prime example 
of establishing a more tolerant framework for social order. 
 
Sieges as stalemates 
 
If the conditions for truces cannot be found it might be possible to develop the mentality of 
sieges, or perhaps better expressed as ‘stalemates’. Like truces, sieges/stalemates are interesting 
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states of affairs. We are accustomed to think of the ‘decisive battle’ as the key moment in any 
war, and particularly in bringing about the conditions for the enemy’s defeat. But historically 
most wars were ended ‘peacefully’ in the context of a siege/stalemate. In fact until relatively 
recently, most wars were pretty leisurely affairs. There were few actual battles, which were 
quickly over anyway. Most wars took the form of long marches – endless wandering about the 
countryside looking for the enemy – and long sieges of towns and fortifications. The (re-
)development of a ‘siege/stalemate mentality’ amongst modern day antagonistically poised 
combatants provides another opportunity for the ‘temporary’ interruption of conflicts. If such 
sieges/stalemates could be turned into semi-permanent states of affairs, in effect the equivalent of 
‘toleration’ would have been established. 
 
Appeasement 
 
Perhaps more controversially, there remains something to be said for resurrecting the heavily 
discredited concept of 'appeasement' as a principle for the strengthening of toleration. 
Appeasement is a tougher category than a truce or a siege/stalemate because it requires the 
stronger party to genuinely give up an advantage that it could exercise if it wished. It thus 
requires the stronger party to be magnanimous; to forego or suppress its own interest in the name 
of the common good of both interests. It can also be considered as a way of tolerating the 
intolerant (always a problem for more conventional conceptions of toleration). This category is a 
'dangerous' one, because it requires suppression of an advantage which could backfire. But the 
taking of such risks is a necessary feature of any system that has as its ultimate objective the 
strengthening of the peace overall.  
 
Separation 
 
Finally, however, we may have to face afresh the fact that agreement on an ‘integrated’ 
toleration is not possible to achieve. The conventional liberal wisdom is that integration and 
multiculturalism are the ultimate virtues for a tolerant society.  
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An important salient feature of liberalism is its presumption that there exist a political 
community that is homogeneous enough to be governed, regulated or managed. In this case 
sovereignty is able to exercise its effective control because a generalized consent is in principle 
possible. But without this presumption the juridico-legal notion of sovereignty is unhinged. A 
number of centres of political capacity can exist amongst which there is no necessary 
presumption of social passivity and consensual agreement. Any such agreement must be 
negotiated or struggled for, and will only ever be contingently established. 
 
So under these circumstances, it may be necessary to reinstate physical separated nesses as a 
realistic criterion for toleration. This would echo points that could be made about such 
international orders as the Holy Roman Empire or the Ottoman Empire, where physical 
separation between confessional, cultural, legal and ethnic groupings was common, even as they 
existed in close proximity to one another. De facto separation has tended to arise in cases of 
extreme antagonistic pluralism anyway, so now may be the time to embrace this more formally, 
and organize for it, rather than maintain the pretence of integration and multiculturalism. 
Properly organized and supervised, such an approach might actually enhance toleration rather 
than undermine it, as is often argued. It is not necessarily a ‘failure’ of toleration to recognize the  
desire of particular communities to live apart if they cannot live together. This involves a 
(reluctant) substitution of ‘mutual extraterritoriality’ with ‘separate territoriality’. 
 
After this brief discussion of separatedness of combatants it is useful to raise once again the issue 
of what all this toleration is about? In response, and to reiterate: the problem is that the legacy of 
nation state building and imperialism has left some uncomfortable, or grossly unfair, and often 
unsustainable ‘territorial boundary problems’, the inequities of which are understandably the 
objects of struggle for those disadvantaged by the arbitrariness of those processes. The ‘hand of 
fate’ involved in nation building and imperialism has left many with an outcome that does not at 
all suit their purpose or expectation. Existing nation states are nothing more than ‘communities 
of fate’. Why should those disadvantaged groups not challenge the existing boundaries of the 
international system and upset any carefully crafted toleration built around them? 
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The response to this is of course they will. The regime of toleration suggested here does not 
justify the intolerable. There will always be conflict. The conception of politics deployed in this 
analysis perceives it as constituted by, and constitutive of, ‘disagreements’ and ‘antagonisms’. 
These cannot be escaped I would suggest. They cannot be neatly ‘negotiated’ out of the system 
as a generalized ‘tolerant’ consensus and agreement emerges. But what the suggested regime of 
toleration requires as a minimum is that all sides accept to a certain extent the existing 
boundaries of the system as a legitimate aspect of its existence. This does require a certain 
compromise, a certain appreciation that the legacy it embodies carries its own legitimacy, that 
these boundaries cannot be destroyed at will since they have constituted their own ‘new’ sets of 
expectations and commitments, whether this is liked or not. 
 
As suggested above, perhaps unfortunately peace is a very conservative objective. It requires 
parties to feel that they would be less threatened than with the existing status quo. It is risky 
since it might put any party at a disadvantage, making it reliant on the goodwill of others and at 
their convenience. This is why peace cannot be associated with radical change. It cannot be part 
of a major re-organization of the social order. It requires a ‘de-escalation’ of conflict and turmoil 
rather than any potential ‘re-escalation’ of it. 
 
In addition, it must be remembered that international peace can only be made by states. Peace 
movements are all very well and have their place, but they do not make peace and have not been 
able to put serious pressure on governments if they are intent on conflict. Witness the recent war 
on Iraq. Although anti-war peace movements were highly active in the USA, the UK and 
elsewhere, and the majority of the populations in these countries did not initially support the war, 
this made little difference. The problem is, states are not ‘moral agents’. They are political and 
strategic agents who calculate the possible advantages and disadvantages of policies according to 
their perceived interests, survival instincts, ‘hard’ choices, and so on. This makes peace above all 
a political calculation, where moral considerations will always be secondary. 
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BY WAY OF CONCLUSION 
 
Consider Figure 4.13 This figure sums up many of the arguments of this paper. 
 
[Figure 4 here] 
 
In the top half, two scenarios for the international system are sketched: antagonistic pluralism14 
and tolerant pluralism. 
The suggestion in this paper is that the issue is broadly one of moving from situation 1 to 2 in the 
top half of the figure, not by replacing 1 by 2 but by ‘surrounding’ 1 by 2 so that 1 is ‘squeezed’ 
and finally ‘dissolves’ into 2 (thereby ‘changing the regime’).15 The direction of movement thus 
goes from 2 to 1.  
 
But perhaps there are other considerations and positions indicated by situations 3 and 4 shown in 
the bottom half of Figure 4. If we are actually in the position of situation 3 – one that might be 
termed ‘unilateral antagonism’ -- and this may be nearer the present case given the role of the 
USA -- then it is going to be doubly difficult to move to situation 2. But is a move from 3 to 2 
likely to be more difficult that a move from 1 to 2 (by which 2 ‘enfolds’ 1)? At this stage I leave 
a response to this question open. 
 
What has been argued in this paper is that there exists a genuine threat to the continuation of a 
broadly liberal international (and domestic) order, driven by the re-emergence of what I have 
called spiritual martial power, aligned to the rise of religious and secular fundamentalisms. This 
risk should not be over-exaggerated but it exists nonetheless. A key feature of such 
                                                 
13 I thank Andy Dobson for suggesting this diagrammatic representation. 
14  To be precise about this, antagonistic-pluralism is a system in which the pluralization of interests and social 
forces intensifies to such an extent that it becomes increasingly difficult to organize compromises and agreement 
between these interests and forces, and in which the usual channels of democratic activity begin to look increasingly 
suspect and loose their legitimacy. This new period is one often accompanied by an increase in the extent of 
ungovernable manic capitalism. Manic capitalism is a frenetic economic system embodying an intense and 
uncontrollable dynamic of competitive activity driven as much by corruption, marketeering, speculation, 
profiteering and mismanagement as by genuine ordered economic exchange. 
15 ‘Changing the regime’ is not the same as a ‘regime change’. Regime change involves an intervention from 
‘outside’ to change the political leadership, government or administration. Changing the regime implies a process of 
the application of pressure or negotiation to reform, adapt of change the structure, peacefully and with consent. 
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fundamentalisms is that they both promote and trade-off the deterritorialization of social, 
political, cultural and economic activity that is seen as a feature of contemporary globalization. 
In the case of ‘warrior politics’ in particular such a deterritorialization represents a real danger. If 
this is the case, the issue becomes how to re-territorializes the activities and disputes engendered 
by this reappearance and re-emergence. Here the argument was that this requires a re-
examination of the nature of international borders, and indeed the re-emphasis on their role, not 
just in respect to containing disorder and restoring the capacity for governance, but also as a way 
of re-configuring international toleration and righting a wrong. 
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 Figure 2:  Constructing Territory II 
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Figure 3: Number of Countries and Trade Openness. 
Source: Alesina et al, 2003, Figure 2. 
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